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JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: KELP
FARMING BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA*
INTRODUCTION**
New ocean uses, made possible by technological developments,
have rendered the law of the sea conventions currently in force ob-
solete. The United Nations conventions to which the United States
is a party do not recognize the validity of a coastal state's exercise
of exclusive jurisdiction over resources in waters beyond the terri-
torial sea.1 But since vast exploitation of ocean resources has now
become feasible, a new legal regime is needed. While the tradi-
tional "regime of the high seas was not sufficiently responsive to
coastal state interests,. . . the regime of the territorial sea was not
sufficiently responsive to navigational and other non-coastal inter-
ests."' 2 For these and other reasons, the Third United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), on April 30, 1982,
voted to adopt the Convention negotiated by more than 150 states
over a period of eight years.'
* This research was sponsored by the New York Sea Grant Institute under a grant
from the Office of Sea Grant, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
U.S. Department of Commerce. The U.S. Government (including Sea Grant Office) is
authorized to produce and distribute reprints for governmental purposes notwithstanding
any copyright notation appearing hereon.
** As this Comment was going to press, President Reagan, by Proclamation 5030 on
March 10, 1983, expanded the jurisdiction of the United States to an "exclusive economic
zone" extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territo-
rial sea is measured. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983). The Proclamation
acknowledges the effectiveness of the economic zone concept in international law. The issues
outlined in this Comment are still important, however, since there was no discussion in the
Proclamation of the alternatives available or how this particular course of action will affect
United States foreign policy.
1. Under the Convention on the High Seas, for example, any state may appropriate the
resources of waters beyond the territorial sea, subject to the requirement of "reasonable
regard" for the high seas freedoms of other states. Convention on the High Seas, negotiated
at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered
into force Sept. 30, 1962).
2. Oxman, An Analysis of the Exclusive Economic Zone as Formulated in the Infor-
mal Composite Negotiating Text, in LAw oF THE SEA: STATE PRAcTIcE IN ZONEs OF SPECIL
JURISDICTON, 57, 61 (T. Clingan, Jr. ed. 1982).
3. See United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. GAOR (182d
plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/SR. 182 (prov. ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Third
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The purpose of this Comment is to examine the meaning and
legal status of the exclusive economic zone concept in the Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea and in customary international law in
order to evaluate the various ways in which the United States may
assert jurisdiction4 over kelp farming operations in waters beyond
the territorial sea. The cultivation and harvesting of kelp for con-
version into methane gas promises to be a source of energy in the
near future. The United States has an interest in developing kelp
farms for energy production, but because it is more practical to
locate kelp farms in waters beyond the territorial sea, competing
interests in United States ocean policy come into play. The na-
tion's navigational interests require a policy limiting coastal state
jurisdiction to a narrow territorial sea, but use of the ocean for
fishing and energy production calls for extension of jurisdiction be-
yond the territorial sea.
I. KELP FARMING AS A USE OF THE OCEAN FOR ENERGY
PRODUCTION
A discussion of current research on methods of converting kelp
to methane gas will highlight the characteristics of kelp farming
operations which are significant under international law. The
United States has supported research on kelp farming and conver-
sion of kelp to methane gas as part of the Biomass Energy Systems
program under the United States Department of Energy's Solar
Energy Program. The primary objective of the program is the de-
velopment of technology for the production of fuel from biomass in
order to reduce the demand for petroleum and natural gas. The
program also supports the transfer of technology to private indus-
try.5 Although aquaculture, which includes kelp farming, is still in
the developmental stage,6 it is anticipated that a low cost supply of
U.N. Conference].
4. "Jurisdiction," as it is used in this Comment, means "exclusive management author-
ity." Cf. 50 C.J.S. Jurisdiction 315 (Supp. 1982) (Jurisdiction is the authority of the sover-
eign power to govern or legislate; the power or right to exercise authority; control; and it is
the extent or range of judicial or other authority). See also State ex rel Dreyer v. Brekke, 75
N.D. 468, 28 N.W.2d 598 (1947).
5. 1981 Department of Energy Authorization: Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Energy Development and Application of the Committee on Science and Technology, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 392 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1981 DOE Authorization Hearings].
6. Fiscal Year 1982, Department of Energy Authorization: Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Energy Development and Application of the Committee on Science and
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feedstock for conversion into fuels may be provided by largescale
energy farms by the turn of the century."
The United States Navy installed the first experimental kelp
farm in 1974, 60 miles off the coast of California, near San Cle-
mente Island." Laboratory experiments had shown that the solar
energy stored in giant California kelp, Macrocystis pyrifera, could
be converted to methane gas by harvesting and processing the
kelp. Because large kelp farms in the coastal area could interfere
with shipping and other essential sea uses near the shore, it was
necessary to locate the farm in water deeper than that of the natu-
ral habitat of the kelp. To insure adequate access to light, the
young kelp were attached to ropes on a raft-like structure which
was held forty feet below the surface and moored to the ocean
floor.9 Researchers found that the nutrient-rich water near the
ocean floor had to be pumped up to the kelp. This upwelling of the
ocean-bottom waters enabled the kelp to flourish in the new envi-
ronment.10 The upwelling also fostered an increase in the number
of fish and other marine animals in the area.1 The only negative
impact the kelp farm might have on the environment was the in-
convenience which would be caused if large quantities of kelp were
to break loose and wash up on the beach after a storm.
Various models for kelp farms have been proposed, ranging in
size from a quarter-acre experimental farm to a 100-square-mile
farm."2 The kelp farm structure might include a processing plant
and living quarters. 3 A large kelp farm may be held in position by
a propulser rather than by moorings attached to the ocean floor.
14
Technology, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1268 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1982 DOE Fiscal
Hearings].
7. 1981 DOE Authorization Hearings, supra note 5, at 393.
8. A. GOLDIN, OcEANs oF ENERGY 102 (1980). The Navy withdrew from the project after
less than two years and was replaced by Global Marine Development, Inc., and the General
Electric Company. Id. at 107. The Department of Energy has continued to provide funding
for kelp farming experiments. 1982 DOE Fiscal Hearings, supra note 6, at 1199.
9. A. GOLDIN, supra note 8, at 100-04.
10. Id. at 106.
11. Id. at 107.
12. Id. at 108, 111.
13. Id. at 110-11.
14. Id. at 111. At the regional level, New York Sea Grant Institute has been collaborat-
ing with the General Electric Company, Gas Research Institute, New York State Energy
Research Development Authority, and the New York State Gas Group, on projects relating
to kelp or seaweed cultivation for energy production. See New York Sea Grant Institute,
ALCHEMY FOR THE 80'S: RICHES FROM OUR COASTAL REsOURCES 10 (1982). It is expected that
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Tropical waters as well as those of temperate zones are suitable,
but at very great ocean depths, the problems in upwelling nutrient-
rich water increase. Kelp farming could also be done in conjunc-
tion with an ocean thermal energy conversion facility.15
These research projects and proposals have certain common
features which are significant in international law. They involve
exclusive occupation of an ocean area beyond the territorial sea
and the attachment of young kelp to a raft-like grid structure; they
also require upwelling of nutrients from the ocean bottom waters.
The potential exists for pollution of the nearby waters or shore by
large quantities of kelp which could break off from the kelp farm
structure."' Finally, the cultivation of kelp serves an economic pur-
pose. These characteristics fit easily within the economic zone pro-
visions of article 56 of the new Law of the Sea Treaty.
II. THE PRESENT EFFECT OF THE ECONOMIC ZONE PROVISIONS
The new Convention grants coastal states exclusive jurisdic-
tion over resources in a zone extending 200 nautical miles from the
baseline. Article 56 provides:
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, con-
serving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil and
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Con-
vention with regard to:
(1) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(2) marine scientific research;
(3) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
"Long Island Lighting Company could get methane equivalent to half the natural gas it
needs from a farm 10 miles wide and 38 miles long." Id. Sea Grant project engineers envi-
sion a kelp farm structure supporting more than one marketable crop, such as seaweed and
shellfish or finfish, simultaneously. Id. at 13.
15. Keith, The International Regulation of Ocean Floating Energy Platforms, in LAW
OF THE SEA: NEGLECTED ISSUES 275, 276 (J. Gamble ed. 1979).
16. The question of whether international conventions controlling ocean pollution
would apply to kelp farms is beyond the scope of the present inquiry. See SOLAR ENERGY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SELECTED LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO OCEAN THEn-
MAL ENERGY CO NVERSION DEVELOPMENT 26-32 (June 1979) [hereinafter cited as IssuEs RE-
LATED TO OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION].
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(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
II. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Conven-
tion in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to
the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible
with the provisions of this Convention.
HIL. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and
subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI."
It seems that the economic zone provisions in article 56 of the
new Convention would readily sanction kelp farming within 200
miles of the coastal state's baseline. Kelp farming could be viewed
within the categories of "exploiting" and "managing" natural re-
sources or as an activity "for the economic exploitation and explo-
ration" of the zone, such as the "production of energy from the
water."18 Although kelp farming uses the water and ocean bottom
nutrients, it is the kelp itself which yields up the stored solar en-
ergy. Thus, kelp farming is not "production of energy from water,"
but it is an analogous economic use.
Article 60 provides that "the coastal State shall have the ex-
clusive right to construct and to authorize and regulate the con-
struction, operation and use of. . .installations and structures for
the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic pur-
poses .. ."' The kelp farm structure thus falls within coastal
state jurisdiction. Articles 56 and 60 seem to provide the coastal
state with the right to jurisdiction and control of sea uses such as
that entailed by kelp farming, but the legal status and scope of
these provisions remain to be established.
A. The Relationship Between Treaty Law and Customary Inter-
national Law
The question arises as to the present effect of the Law of the
Sea Treaty provisions on the economic zone because of the unique
circumstances and method of negotiation of UNCLOS III.
Ordinarily, the provisions of a treaty are binding only when the
treaty comes into effect and then only upon the parties to the
treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that
"[treaty] provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or
17. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 56, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/
122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
18. Id. at art. 56(1)(a).
19. Id. at art. 60(1)(b).
1982] 889
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fact which took place ... before the date of the entry into force of
the treaty with respect to that party."20 A state which has signed a
treaty is under an obligation "to refrain from acts which would de-
feat the object and purpose of a treaty."21 However, the Law of the
Sea Treaty opened for signature on December 8, 1982, and, al-
though 119 nations have signed, it has not yet been signed by the
United States,22 and thus it cannot be said to be binding upon the
United States as treaty law. Nevertheless, some of the provisions
of the Law of the Sea Treaty have achieved a legally binding effect
as principles of customary international law.
For an understanding of why the economic zone concept has
gained status as a new principle of international law, one must
consider the negotiating process used by UNCLOS III and the
"new dynamic" it has created for the development of customary
international law.23 The elements required for the recognition of
the emergence of a new principle of customary international law
were formulated in 1950 by Judge Manley 0. Hudson as follows:
(a) concordant practice by a number of states with reference to a type of
situation falling within the domain of international relations;
(b) continuation or repetition of the practice over a considerable period of
time;
(c) conception that the practice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing
international law; and
(d) general acquiescence in the practice by other States."
These criteria have been criticized as raising more questions
than they answer since the terms "a number of states," "a consid-
erable period of time," "prevailing international law" and "general
acquiescence" are undefined.25 It has been suggested that a new
theory of customary international law is required to account for
20. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, negotiated at Vienna, May 23, 1969,
art. 28, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 63 Am. J. IN'L L. 875 (1969) (en-
tered into force on January 27, 1980).
21. Id. at 18.
22. Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A.J., Feb. 1983, at 156.
23. B. Flemming, Customary International Law and the Law of the Sea: A New Dy-
namic, in LAw OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION 489 (T.
Clingan, Jr. ed. 1982).
24. Id. at 491-92 (quoting Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 24, [1950]
2 Y. B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/16).
25. Cf. id. at 492 (citing A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7
(1971)).
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the phenomena arising out of UNCLOS 111.2 6 UNCLOS IH has
ushered in a new era for customary international law in relation to
treaty law and the economic zone concept is the principal illustra-
tion of this new relationship.
The economic zone concept represents a departure from the
centuries-old dichotomy between the high seas doctrine and the
territorial sea doctrine. The doctrine of freedom of the high seas
was developed by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Cornelius van
Bynkershoek (1673-1743) of the Netherlands in the belief that the
seas could accommodate all navigational, commercial, fishing and
military uses.28 The theoretical basis of the doctrine has been
eroded by the achievements of modern technology; the resources of
the seas are no longer seen as inexhaustible.29 For example, be-
tween 1970 and 1975 it became apparent that fishing resources
were subject to depredation.30
Gbneral acceptance of the 200-mile economic zone concept at
UNCLOS Ill resulted from the recognition that the coastal state
was the most suitable agent to manage and conserve coastal re-
sources, and the "desire of the Third World states to have new
economic resources clearly allocated to them by the international
community."3 1 A further incentive to agreement on the economic
zone concept was the perceived danger that the ocean might be
parceled out among the nations. John Selden (1584-1654) of Eng-
land had argued for national sovereignty over ocean space and in
the 1970s Selden's "closed" sea seemed to loom on the horizon as
many states made claims to various types of extended jurisdiction.
Unilateral claims extending national jurisdiction were and remain
a growing concern in the international community. The United
States had set the pattern for such claims in the Truman Procla-
mations of 1945; it spent the next thirty-seven years trying to limit
26. Id. at 498.
27. Id. See also Howard, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 TEX. INT'L L. J. 321 (1981). The emergence of the
twelve-mile limit for the territorial sea is another illustration.
28. F. CHEN, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON DEEP SEABED MINING AND FREEDOM
OF THE SEAS 1 (1981).
29. Newton, Inexhaustibility as a Law of the Sea Determinant, 16 TEx. INT'L L. J. 369,
410-11 (1981).




jurisdictional claims by other nations.3 2
B. State Practice: Unilateral Claims to Extended Jurisdiction
before UNCLOS III
The Truman Proclamations, asserting United States jurisdic-
tion and control over the resources of the continental shel 3 con-
tiguous to the United States and over fisheries resources, 8 4 had
been formulated during the Roosevelt administration.", In a mem-
orandum dated July 1, 1939, to the attorney general and the secre-
taries of state, navy, and interior, Roosevelt suggested that federal
jurisdiction could be exercised as far out as wells could be drilled: "
'inventive genius has moved jurisdiction out to sea to the limit of
inventive genius.' " 86
The international response to the unilateral action of the
United States was adoption by other states of various kinds of
zones of jurisdiction.3 7 Because coastal states saw the benefit to be
derived by similar action on their own behalf, Truman's proclama-
tions were uncontested and the coastal state's right of control over
resources of the continental shelf soon became a principle of cus-
tomary international law and was codified in 1958 by the Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf.
8
The Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf expressly
limited United States' jurisdiction to the continental shelf and
32. A. HOLLICK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 296 (1981).
33. The continental shelf is "the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to
the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or beyond that
limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
resources of the said areas." Convention on the Continental Shelf, negotiated at Geneva,
Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force
June 10, 1964).
34. See Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1943-48 compilation), reprinted in 59 Stat.
885 (1945) (concerning U.S. policy on coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas);
Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 compilation), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945)
(concerning U.S. policy on the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the continental
shelf).
35. A. HOLLICK, supra note 32, at 18.
36. Id. at 30.
37. For example, by 1955, twenty-two nations had adopted legislation claiming jurisdic-
tion over resources of the continental shelf. See Johnston & Gold, Extended Jurisdiction, in
LAw OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL JURISDICTION 3, 31-34 table 1 (T.
Clingan, Jr. ed. 1982).
38. Convention on the Continental Shelf, negotiated at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
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maintained that the waters above the shelf retained their character
as "high seas." 9 The United States' naval and distant-water fish-
ing interests dictated a policy favoring a narrow territorial sea. For
these reasons, the United States objected to claims by El Salvador,
Argentina, and Mexico to sovereignty over a 200-mile zone which
included the waters above the continental shelf. The trilateral dec-
laration in 1952 by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru of a 200-mile "mari-
time zone" was likewise disputed.40
Between 1945 and 1970, 11 states claimed a 200-mile zone and
most of these states claimed it as a territorial sea.41 The signifi-
cance of labelling the claim "territorial sea" is that a state may
exercise sovereignty over its territorial sea and other states have no
right to exercise high seas freedoms in the territorial sea.42 Sover-
eignty extends "to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to
its bed and subsoil. '43 The sovereignty claimed by the coastal state
over the territorial sea was similar to that exercised on land, with
the traditional exception for "innocent passage. ' 44 The limits of
the territorial sea were disputed until UNCLOS III established an
outer limit of twelve nautical miles.45 The three-mile limit favored
by the United States had its origin in the practical limitations
upon earlier defense capabilities, when 3 miles was the greatest
distance a cannon could fire. Present claims to a territorial sea in-
clude 21 countries at 3 miles, 78 countries at 12 miles, and 15
countries at 150-200 miles.46 After the Caracas session of UNCLOS
III in 1974, 71 additional nations among the 137 coastal states es-
39. "The character as high seas of the waters above the continental shelf and the right
to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected." Proclamations Con-
cerning United States Jurisdiction Over National Resources in Coastal Areas and the
High Seas, 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 485 (1945).
40. For a discussion of the trilateral declaration of Chile, Ecuador and Peru, see D.
JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE SEA: SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND
APPRAISAL OF CURRENT TRENDS (1973).
41. Burke, National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary
Law of the Sea, 9 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 289 (1981).
42. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, negotiated at Geneva,
Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force
on Sept. 10, 1964).
43. Id. at art. 2.
44. Richardson, Law of the Sea: Navigation and Other Traditional National Security
Considerations, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 559 (1982).
45. LOS Convention, supra note 17, at art. 3.
46. Johnston & Gold, supra note 37, at 47-50 table III.
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tablished 200-mile zones of various sorts.47
Because of the rapid increase in the number of nations ex-
tending their jurisdiction as well as the problem that many of them
were "friends" of the United States, the United States was not
able to challenge effectively the numerous claims.48 The costs were
simply too high. The resulting "acquiescence" in the practice of
many states fostered the development of the economic zone con-
cept in customary international law."
C. UNCLOS III: The Effect of Negotiation by Consensus on the
Emergence of the Economic Zone Concept in International Law
Arvid Pardo of Malta had centered attention on the interde-
pendence of nations in 1967 by winning the unanimous support of
the United Nations General Assemby for his proposal that the
deep seabed minerals be regarded as "the common heritage of
mankind":
[Pardo] drew the attention of the Assembly to the vast riches hidden on the
deep ocean floor of the world ocean which the technological revolution was
rapidly making accessible to exploration and exploitation, and which did not
belong to any nation. He pointed to the dangers of a military competition to
dominate the deep seas. He saw a race developing to carve up the no-man's
land of the ocean floor in the way the black continent had been carved up by
the colonial powers in past centuries, which would give rise to acute conflict
and pollution. He explained how the old law of the sea, based on the premises
of the sovereignty of coastal states over a narrow belt of ocean along the
coasts and of the freedom of the seas beyond this, was being eroded. He sug-
gested that a new concept, the common heritage of mankind, must take the
place of the old freedom of the sea. He stressed the ecological unity of ocean
space and the interactions between all areas and all uses of ocean space.50
Pardo's famous speech led to the convening of UNCLOS III.51
Whereas UNCLOS I (1958) and II (1960) had involved partici-
pation by 87 and 88 states respectively, UNCLOS III (1974-1982)
involved delegations from more than 150 states. This broad-based
participation, as well as the eight-year duration of the Conference,
contributed to the impact the UNCLOS III consensus regarding
47. Id.
48. Richardson, supra note 44, at 554.
49. Howard, supra note 27, at 332.
50. Johnston & Gold, supra note 37, at 53-54 & n.24 (citing THE COMMON HERITAGE:
SELECTED PAPERS ON OcENs AND WORLD ORDER 1967-1974 11 (E. Borges ed. 1975)).
51. Id. at 6.
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the economic zone had on customary international law. During the
conference process, the basic rules agreed upon became interna-
tional law and served as the basis for state practice and expecta-
tions. The economic zone emerged as positive law from the confer-
ence by a process "neither wholly legislative nor wholly customary,
but in fact a combination of the two.
'
52
The dynamic interplay between treaty and custom in UN-
CLOS III derives from the consensus method used by the Confer-
ence. Pre-conference sessions had made it clear that traditional
conference procedures would not lead to a treaty that was gener-
ally acceptable to all parties. The majority rule method'had the
disadvantage that it could produce an alienated minority, with the
further undesirable result that the treaty provisions might fail to
achieve general acceptance. Weighted voting was, of course, politi-
cally unacceptable in this type of conference.53 Since all desired an
agreed regime, and since sea uses involve a high level of interde-
pendence, the consensus method was appropriate and assured
broadly based support.5 Accordingly, Rules 37 through 40 of the
conference rules listed procedures to ensure that all efforts at
reaching consensus be exhausted before delegates resort to a
vote.55 These rules were adopted because it was recognized that a
"powerful minority with major maritime interests and capabilities"
confronted a "weak majority. . with no major maritime capabili-
ties.'"56 Ambassador Evenson of Norway described the consensus
method of producing a "package deal" which would bring all na-
tions in on the final result:
52. Oxman, supra note 2, at 58.
53. Buzan, Negotiating by Consensus, 75 Am. J. INrL L. 324, 326-27 (1981).
54. Id. at 327. The consensus principle approved by the UN General Assembly at its
2169th meeting on November 16, 1973, was written into the conference rules of procedure
after acceptance of the following "Declaration incorporating the 'Gentleman's Agreement'
made by the President and endorsed by the Conference at its 19th meeting on 27 June
1974":
Bearing in mind that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and
need to be considered as a whole and the desirability of adopting a Convention
on the Law of the Sea which will secure the widest possible acceptance.
The Conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive
matters by way of consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until
all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.
Id. at 348 app. & n.1.




We had to proceed from issue to issue, from chapter to chapter. We had to
work in main committees, in all types of formal and informal groups in order
to build with infinite care, a compromise package comprising the totality. In
this stepwise approach we also had to build up confidence based on the self-
evident assumption that delegations and states, although not formally bound,
would stand by their express or tacit commitments. If one main state or
group of states rescind one main element of the package, the whole package
would fall apart and the compromise package elaborated with such finesse,
perhaps even ingenuity, over the years would collapse like a house of cards. A
lack of understanding of this main element of the gentleman's agreement ac-
cepted by all in 1973, would spell disaster for the consensus principle.57
The extension of national jurisdiction over resources in an eco-
nomic zone extending 200 miles from the baseline was one of the
first issues on which consensus was achieved at the first substan-
tive negotiating session of UNCLOS III in Caracas in 1974. Ambas-
sador Aguilar summarized the work of Committee II, which was
responsible for preparing treaty articles on offshore jurisdiction for
subsequent negotiation:
The idea of a territorial sea of twelve miles and an exclusive economic zone
beyond the territorial sea up to a total maximum distance of 200 miles is, at
least at this time, the keystone of the compromise solution favoured by the
majority of States participating in the Conference ...
Acceptance of this idea is, of course, dependent on the satisfactory solu-
tion of other issues, especially the issue of passage through straits used for
international navigation, the outermost limit of the continental shelf and the
actual retention of this concept, and, last but not least, the aspirations of the
land-locked countries and other countries which, for one reason or another,
consider themselves geographically disadvantaged.
There are, in addition, other problems to be studied and solved in con-
nection with this idea, for example, those relating to archipelagoes and the
regime of islands in general.
It is also necessary to go further into the matter of the nature and char-
acteristics of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, a subject on which
important differences of opinion still persist.5 8
The United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet
Union were among the maritime nations which changed their posi-
tion from opposition to support of the economic zone concept dur-
ing the Caracas session. For their support, these nations sought
concessions on various other issues, but the change in position was
57. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth
Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1982) (quoting a statement by Ambassador Jens
Evensen of Norway, Informal Plenary (Aug. 10, 1981)).
58. A. HOLLICK, supra note 32, at 296-97.
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seen initially as a victory for the Group of 77, who wanted greater
control over the ocean resources off their coasts."9 The United
States changed its position because it preferred international stan-
dards to unilateral action. 0 By 1976, it had become clear that the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, to-
gether with Canada, Australia, and Norway, were to'be the princi-
pal beneficiaries of the economic zone concept."1 Professor W.
Burke also commented that the economic zone benefits the richer
nations and although Mexico derives benefit from the economic
zone, most third world countries do not. 2
The exclusive economic zone was established as a "referent
principle" for the Conference during 1974. Following that consen-
sus, more than seventy nations unilaterally claimed an economic
zone.6 3 These unilateral claims tended to establish the concept in
customary international law and complemented the conventional
law process. The question is whether the consensus achieved at the
Conference, together with the practice of states, is sufficient to give
the economic zone concept status as customary international law.
There is widespread support for the view that the exclusive
economic zone had become customary international law even
before the convention was adopted. As early as 1977, Professor
Louis Henkin wrote: "It is a foregone conclusion, I believe, that an
exclusive economic zone will be written into law if the Conference
succeeds; it will emerge as law in fact even if the conference
fails." In May of 1982, Henkin, as chief reporter of the tentative
draft of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, told the annual meeting of the American Law Insti-
59. The Group of 77 consists of more than 110 poor or developing states which advo-
cate the new international economic order. The Group of 77 emerged in international polit-
ics in 1964, but functioned most effectively in UNCLOS 1II. See Juda, UNCLOS III and the
New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 223 (1979). See also Fried-
man & Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law
of the Sea, 16 SAN DIGO L. REV. 555 (1979); see generally W. BRAND'r, NORTH-SOUTH: A
PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980).
60. Martens, Evolution of Coastal State Jurisdiction, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 531, 546-47
(1976).
61. A. HOLLICK, supra note 32, at 286.
62. Burke, Commentary, in LAW OF THE SEA: STATE PRACTICE IN ZONES OF SPECIAL Ju-
RISDICTION 470 (T. Clingan, Jr. ed. 1982).
63. Johnston & Gold, supra note 37, at 47-50 table IIl.
64. Henkin, The Changing Law of the Sea: Technology, Law and Politics, in MARINE
TECHNOLOGY AND LAW 137, 142 (1977).
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tute that proposed section 511 of the Restatement recognized the
200-mile exclusive economic zone. He emphasized that the United
States "has recognized the 200-mile zone in principle and ... is
resisting only the idea that this zone is not to be considered 'high
seas' for certain purposes."6 5
A representative statement of the view that the economic zone
was a principle of international law before the adoption of the con-
vention is that by A. Koers: "The legitimacy of the 200-mile zone
is really no longer in doubt even though the new treaty is not even
a draft convention."66
A more cautious view was expressed by the Soviets who main-
tained that the status of the economic zone as customary law was
open to question and depended on the package deal that was to be
worked out.6 7 When the proposal was made at the final negotiating
session in April 1982, that the text of the convention as a whole be
adopted, the United States insisted that the consensus principle be
abandoned. This had the significant consequence of barring specu-
lation that the provisions of the convention might become custom-
ary international law upon adoption by consensus.6 s By forcing a
vote, the United States sought to call into question the results of
the "package deal." The 4 nations that voted against adoption of
the convention69 and the 17 that abstained" did not prevent the
adoption of the convention, which was carried by a vote of 130 in
65. 50 U.S.L.W 2704 (May 1, 1982). See also Henkin, Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States (Revised): Tentative Draft No. 3, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 653, 655
(1982).
66. See also Burke, supra note 41, at 313 n.2; Howard, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, 16 Tax. INT'L L. J.
321, 332 (1981); Molitor, The U.S. Deep Seabed Mining Regulations: The Legal Basis for
an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN DIoo L. REv. 599, 606 (1982); Morin, Jurisdiction Beyond
200 Miles: A Persistent Problem, 10 CALIF. W. ITr'L L. J. 514, 533 (1980); Shyam, The
Emerging Fisheries Regime: Implications for India, 8 OcEAN DEV. & INTL' L. J. 35, 35
(1980).
67. Burke, supra note 41, at 315 n.5 (citing Kovalyov, The Economic Zone and its Le-
gal Status, INT'L AFFAIRS (Moscow), Feb. 1979, at 58).
68. Remark by Renate Platzoeder of West Germany, Law of the Sea Institute Confer-
ence, at Halifax, Nova Scotia (June 22, 1982).
69. Third U.N. Conference, supra note 3, at 9-10 (Israel, Turkey, United States, and
Venezuela).
70. Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, German
Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. Id.
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favor, but they cast some uncertainty on the status of the conven-
tion provisions. The greatest effectiveness of the treaty could only
be achieved by the consensus method. Short of consensus on the
"package deal," it is not clear what the Conference has accom-
plished. State practice again becomes vitally important in deter-
mining what is the law of the sea and what are the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction in the ocean.
III. KELP FARMING AS AN EXERCISE OF AN ECONOMIC ZONE RIGHT
OR AS AN EXERCISE OF A HIGH SEAS FREEDOM
The foregoing discussion of the current legal status of the eco-
nomic zone reveals that the economic zone concept is available to
serve as a basis for the extension of jurisdiction over kelp farming
operations, should the United States choose to recognize the eco-
nomic zone concept as a principle of international law. The eco-
nomic zone concept has been recognized in a limited sense by the
United States in its exercise of jurisdiction over deepwater ports
located beyond the territorial sea,7 1 over fisheries and fishery re-
sources (including almost all marine animal and plant life in the
200-mile zone), 2 and over ocean thermal energy conversion
(OTEC) facilities.7- All these ocean uses are characteristic of an
exclusive economic zone. However, the concept has not been used
as the basis for jurisdiction. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 and
the OTEC Act of 1980 assert that the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. The Fisher-
ies Conservation and Management Act does not appeal to either
the Convention on the High Seas or to the economic zone concept;
it is a broad, unilateral claim to a fishery zone. The United States
remains reluctant to enact broader legislation claiming an eco-
nomic zone, but its position is marked by ambivalence. The na-
tion's navigational interests require a narrow territorial sea and
freedom of the high seas; coastal resource interests call for exten-
sion of jurisdiction over a 200-mile economic zone.
Ambiguity also haunts the exclusive economic zone provisions
of the new Law of the Sea Treaty. The maritime states fought hard
71. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976).
72. Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1976).




to keep the economic zone within the "high seas." The Group of 77
wanted the economic zone to be neither "high seas," nor "territo-
rial sea," but "sui generis."74 The Conference was unable to resolve
the problem and drafted the provisions in an ambiguous manner,
to be worked out by state practice and treaty interpretation. 5
Elliot Richardson has called attention to the qualification of
the coastal state's rights in the exclusive economic zone by article
58, which contains a reference to article 87 on "Freedom of the
High Seas." 8 Article 58, adopted after much debate, reads:
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the free-
doms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the
sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of
ships, aircraft, and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the
other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law ap-
ply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with
this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Con-
vention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the
rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and
regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.
77
The objective of this formulation was to allow for the sea uses in
the exclusive economic zone traditionally regarded as high-seas
freedoms. Article 87 contains a non-exhaustive list of freedoms:
'Freedom of the High Seas.
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this
Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia,
both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations per-
mitted under international law, subject to Part VI;
74. A. HOLLICK, supra note 32, at 14.
75. Id. at 14-15.
76. Richardson, supra note 44, at 573.
77. Id.
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(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas,
and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to
activities in the Area.78
The provisions in the high-seas section apply to "all parts of the
sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, [or] in
the territorial sea. . . . [But], this article does not entail any
abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive
economic zone in accordance with article 58."
79
Article 56 gives the coastal state rights in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone which must be exercised with due regard to the high
seas freedoms which may be exercised in the coastal state's eco-
nomic zone by all other nations with due regard to the coastal
state's rights. A balancing of interests is called for. The compro-
mise achieved by UNCLOS III does not make clear the limits of
permissible uses of the exclusive economic zone by the coastal
state and by other states. State practice will complete what the
treaty only began.
Therefore, although present international law would not pro-
hibit kelp farming operations by the United States within 200
miles of its baseline, the manner in which the United States
chooses to exercise jurisdiction may contribute to the interpreta-
tion of the economic zone concept in international law. Whether
the economic zone is to be read narrowly or broadly by the inter-
national community may be influenced by the approach states take
in exercising offshore jurisdiction for new ocean uses. In drafting
legislation to extend United States' jurisdiction to deepwater ports,
to the 200-mile fisheries zone and to ocean thermal energy conver-
sion facilities beyond the territorial sea, the United States used
two different approaches which may serve as alternative models for
drafting legislation to protect kelp farm operations.
In claiming its 200-mile fisheries zone, the United States felt it
was a "useful drafting technique" to define "fish" to "include all
forms of plant and animal life normally found in coastal waters
and of interest to the Nation."80 Broad jurisdiction over living re-
78. LOS Convention, supra note 17, at art. 87.
79. Id. at art. 86.
80. SENATE COMMIE ON CoMMERCE AND NATIONAL OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG.,
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sources of the zone was sought. At the same time, the jurisdiction
was carefully circumscribed by declaring the zone "high seas" with
respect to scientific research and other high seas freedoms.81 Sena-
tor Thomas J. McIntyre, reporting in 1975 the discussion of the
Committee on Armed Services regarding the proposed legislation
for a fishing zone, noted that it was "vitally important that the
international community understand that [The Fisheries Conser-
vation and Management Act] applies only to regulation of fishing
and fishing conservation and does not indicate an intention or de-
sire by the United States otherwise to extend its jurisdiction." 82
It could be argued that, under the broad definition of "fish,"
that the FCMA provides jurisdiction over kelp farming operations.
The legislative history of the FCMA does not indicate why "fish"
was defined to include all marine plant life; the sole reference to
this definition reads: "[T]his definition is not meant to reflect the
biological definition of fish. Combining all such resources in a sin-
gle term is simply a useful drafting technique."8 "
The definition would prove useful indeed if it spared Congress
from drafting separate legislation to provide jurisdiction over kelp
farming. Kelp, as a marine plant, may be protected under the Fish-
eries Conservation and Management Act, and with it, the facilities
used for its cultivation and harvesting."
The kelp farmer, however, might seek greater certainty that
his enterprise would be protected. Uncertainty derives from the
failure of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act to be
specific as to its intent with regard to marine plants. Marine plants
are vital to the fishing industry because the plants provide shelter,
food, and breeding grounds for fish. However, the drafters may
never have contemplated a kelp farm as being within the Act's
scope, and therefore courts might not recognize a kelp farmer's
claim under the Act. A simple amendment specifying that the kelp
farm is included in the definition of "fish" would clarify the
matter.
2D SEsS., A LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF
1976, 675, (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
81. Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976, § 3(10), 16 U.S.C. § 1802(10)
(1976). See Burke, U.S. Fishery Management and the New Law of the Sea, 76 Am. J. INT'L
L. 24, 49 (1982). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 80, at 663.
82. LEGISLATIVE ISTORY, supra note 80, at 573.
83. Id. at 675.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1812 (1982).
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Alternatively, Congress might prefer to limit the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act to purposes directly related to
the fishing industry. A different approach to jurisdiction could be
taken, following that of the Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act
of 1980.85 There, jurisdiction was declared to be "consistent with
the Convention on the High Seas and general principles of interna-
tional law."8' Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas
provides:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to sub-
ject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised
under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of
international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal
States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable re-
gard to the interests of other states in their exercise of the freedom of the
high seas.
8 7
The appeal to high seas freedoms was based on the theory of
"reasonable use." Gary Knight, discussing international legal issues
relating to ocean thermal energy conversion facilities before ocean
thermal energy conversion legislation was drafted, concluded that
the theory of reasonable use was "simply a short term for initiation
of customary international law development through unilateral
action."88
The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion legislation defines
"high seas" as "that part of the oceans lying seaward of the territo-
rial sea of the United States and outside the territorial sea, as rec-
ognized by the United States, of any other nation."8' 9 This defini-
tion draws attention to the United States' position regarding
recognition of the economic zones claimed by other nations. How-
85. 42 U.S.C. §§,9101-9167 (Supp. V 1981).
86. Id. at § 9101(a)(1).
87. Convention on the High Seas, negotiated at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.LA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
88. Knight, International Jurisdictional Issues Involving OTEC Installations, in
OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION: LEGAL POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL AsPECrs 57-58
(1977).
89. 42 U.S.C. §9102(9), (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
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ever, provision is made to bring the legislation into conformity
with the Law of the Sea Treaty if it is ratified by the United
States.90 The Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion Act provides for
the initiation of negotiations for international agreements which
would "guarantee noninterference" with OTEC facilities.91 Finally,
the jurisdiction asserted over the OTEC facility in the high seas is
declared to be like that over "an area of exclusive Federal jurisdic-
tion located within a State.
'92
Legislation for kelp farming, if modelled upon the Ocean
Thermal Energy Conversion Act, would be drafted narrowly to ex-
tend only to kelp farming activities and would emphasize the high
seas character of the waters beyond the territorial sea. Such legis-
lation would be adequate to protect the interests of the kelp
farmer, but if legislation proliferates, extending limited jurisdiction
over one use and then several more, it may amount to a claim of a
general economic zone. The United States has already extended its
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea for deepwater ports,
fisheries, and ocean thermal energy conversion facilities. 3
Another alternative has been recommended by Professor Ved
Nanda who has suggested that Congress enact legislation creating
a 200-mile "Coastal Energy Conservation and Management Zone"
which would, among other things, provide jurisdiction over kelp-
farming operations. 9' This proposal, when considered together with
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, OTEC legisla-
tion and the Deepwater Port Act, would seem to bring the United
States to the verge of having, in fact, claimed an exclusive eco-
nomic zone.
The United States has an interest in focusing attention on the
essential high seas character of the economic zone. It prefers to
view the coastal state's rights in the economic zone as limited ex-
ceptions to the fundamental freedom of the high seas. The United
States has much to lose if states act to expand the limited jurisdic-
tion provided by the treaty concept of the economic zone.
Bernard Oxman has pointed out that the economic zone con-
cept as developed through the process of customary international
90. Id. at § 9161.
91. Id. at § 9162.
92. Id. at § 9163.
93. See supra notes 80 & 84.
94. IssuEs RELATED To OCAN THERMAL CoNvERSIoN, supra note 16, at 31.
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law is necessarily less precise than that formulated in the treaty,
which cross-references many elements of the text in order to estab-
lish the concept in all its negotiated complexity. Oxman compares
the difference between the customary law concept and the treaty
law concept to the difference between a round of Fr~re Jacques
and a Bach fugue.9 5
In order to avoid promoting the development of the customary
international law economic zone concept, which might broaden to
the detriment of the United States' navigational interests, and in
order to maintain credibility in arguing for a narrow reading of the
economic zone provisions of the treaty, the United States should
claim an economic zone and draft the legislation to reflect the eco-
nomic zone provisions of the new treaty. By emphasizing that the
economic uses of the zone are exceptions to the character of the
zone as high seas, the United States could move forward in devel-
oping economic uses of the zone while at the same time reaffirming
the high seas freedoms required for United States' navigational in-
terests. Support of the economic zone provisions of the new treaty
would enable the United States to claim the fine distinctions nego-
tiated at UNCLOS III as to the high seas character of the zone.
The bill proposed to the House by Representative Breaux
would accomplish these objectives. H.R. 7225 would establish a
200-mile economic zone in which the United States would assert
"national rights" to control and manage the use of all resources."
The "highly migratory species" of fish and scientific research are
excluded from the scope of control asserted in the zone. The bill
reaffirms the recognition of the "freedoms of the high seas pertain-
ing to navigation, overflight, and the laying and maintenance of
submarine cables and pipelines."' This legislative approach would
ensure that the interests of kelp farmers would be protected and it
would thereby encourage the development of kelp farming for the
production of energy.
95. Oxman, supra note 2, at 78.
96. H.R. 7225, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
97. Id at §§ 102, 104.




The choice as to which approach the United States should use
in extending jurisdiction to kelp farming operations in waters be-
yond the territorial sea is a policy decision. This Comment has out-
lined considerations which should influence that choice.
The Fisheries Conservation and Management Act provides ju-
risdiction over all marine plant life in the 200-mile zone. This may
be sufficient to protect the interests of the kelp farmers. If Con-
gress is slow to act on more specific legislation for the benefit of
kelp farmers, or if conflicts in United States' policy forestall con-
gressional action, kelp farmers may proceed on the basis of the
FCMA provisions as they now stand, or as amended to refer specif-
ically to kelp farming.
If it appears that the economic zone as adopted in states' prac-
tice unduly restricts the United States navigational interests, the
United States may choose not to claim a general economic zone
and to challenge the claims of other nations. Under these circum-
stances, legislation for kelp farming would be drafted narrowly,
claiming that kelp farming is a "reasonable use" of the high seas.
This approach has the disadvantage of following several other leg-
islative acts claiming various economic uses as "reasonable uses."
At some point, these claims may amount to a claim of an economic
zone as this is understood in international law, in spite of the ra-
tionale proposed by the United States for labelling these uses as
high seas freedoms.
Alternatively, the United States could enact legislation claim-
ing an energy resources conservation and management zone. Again,
taken together with the fisheries zone and other legislation, this
approach may amount to a general economic zone claim.
Finally, the United States may choose to affirm the validity of
the economic zone provisions of the new Law of the Sea Treaty, as
is done implicitly in the Breaux bill, H.R. 7225.99 Because the
treaty provisions cross reference high seas freedoms and economic
zone rights and duties, this approach would best enable the United
States to develop energy production through kelp farming while at
the same time safeguarding its navigational interests within the ec-
onomic zones of other nations. Support of the economic zone pro-
visions of the treaty by the United States would serve to enhance
99. See supra note 96.
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the viability of the compromises achieved in the provisions. Failure
to support the economic zone treaty provisions might encourage
other states to disregard the treaty provisions as to the character
of the economic zone and foster the development of claims to
greater coastal state control over the economic zone. Taking the
economic zone provisions of the new treaty as the basis of legisla-
tion for kelp farming operations would promote development of
this promising new ocean use without sacrificing the principle of
the freedom of the high seas.
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